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Minimizing Execution Duration in the Presence of
Learning-Enabled Components
Abstract—Autonomous systems are increasingly using compo-
nents that incorporate machine learning and other AI-based
techniques in order to achieve improved performance. We
address the problem of assuring correctness in safety-critical
systems that use such components. We investigate an approach
which formulates the problem as one in which performance is
an objective function to be optimized while safety is a hard
constraint that must be satisfied. We then apply heuristics and
algorithmic techniques from optimization theory in order to solve
the resulting constrained optimization problem.
Index Terms—Learning-enabled components (LECs); Safety-
critical systems; Performance optimization; Run-time monitor-
ing; Typical analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPS’s), includ-
ing unmanned aerial vehicles, self-driving cars, and unmanned
underwater vehicles, are safety-critical. The safety of the run-
time behavior of such safety-critical systems must be assured
before they can be considered for deployment. However it
is challenging to directly apply traditional approaches towards
safety assurance to modern autonomous CPS’s due to multiple
reasons, including the presence of complex and adaptive func-
tionalities depending upon machine learning techniques that
are not well understood in the way that components tradition-
ally used in safety-critical systems are. The importance and the
immense complexity of the problem of obtaining assurance for
autonomous CPS’s that incorporate machine learning has been
widely recognized, and approaches for solving this problem
are being actively sought. For example, the Assured Autonomy
Program [?] of the United States Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) has a goal of creating technology
for establishing assurance of CPS’s that contain “Learning-
Enabled Components” (LECs), which are an abstraction
defined in [?] that generalizes a wide variety of popular
machine learning approaches. In a similar vein, the Assuring
Autonomy International Programme [?] is an initiative funded
by the international insurance company Lloyd’s of London at
the University of York (UK), in response to a 2016 study by
Lloyd’s that identified assurance and regulation as the biggest
obstacles to gaining the benefits of robotics and autonomy.
Yet another important example is the Bounded Behavior
Assurance initiative [?]spearheaded by the major US defense
contractor Northrop Grumman Corporation, which seeks to
define processes for establishing assurance (and eventually,
obtaining certification) that the behavior of unmanned aerial
vehicles that use machine learning to make safety-critical
and mission-critical decisions will always remain within pre-
specified bounds.
It has been observed [?] that predictability of run-time
behavior is key to assuring safety in safety-critical systems.
Although most non-trivial safety-critical systems inevitably
encounter some unpredictability in run-time behavior, safety-
critical systems designers have developed techniques for deal-
ing with inherent run-time unpredictability with regards to
extra-functional properties such as timing (the duration re-
quired to complete execution) or energy consumption. How-
ever, safety-critical systems that make use of LECs tend to
additionally not be predictable from the functional perspective:
the precise “worth” or value of a computation performed
by an LEC that incorporates deep learning or similar AI-
based techniques is often not easily predicted beforehand.
How should one deal with such functional non-predictability
in safety-critical systems? In this paper, we propose a possible
approach towards doing so for a particular form of computa-
tion involving LECs, that possess the following characteristics:
• The overall computation can be looked upon as a multi-stage
one, in which a series of functional blocks are to be
executed in a specified sequence. For an execution of the
computation to be considered correct (and hence safe), a
specified minimum level of service must be obtained over
all the stages; we assume that this minimum level of service
is quantified as a numerical target value.
• We have a choice of different alternative implementations
for each stage of the computation, some or all of which may
involve the use of LECs. Each implementation takes some
duration to complete execution, and achieves an associated
value – a quantitative measure of the quality of the com-
putation that was achieved by executing that implementa-
tion.1 We perform the complete end-to-end computation by
selecting and executing exactly one of the implementation
choices for each stage, in sequence. The total value obtained
by the end-to-end computation is defined to be the sum of
the values associated with the implementations that were
selected for the individual stages.
• We can monitor the computation — determine certain
aspects of system state — after each stage during run-time.
For computations possessing these properties we consider
different approaches for scheduling the computation that can
guarantee safety — i.e., guarantee that the computation will
achieve the specified target value of quality of service —
and optimize for performance – specifically, reduce the
1It may be convenient to think of this value as a measure of the progress
that will be made towards achieving the overall objective for the computation,
if this implementation were selected for this stage of the computation.
overall duration of the computation. We provide a precise
formulation of the scheduling problem that needs to be solved
as a constrained optimization problem (Section ??); explore
a number of algorithms, ranging from simple heuristics that
are efficiently implementable to provably optimal ones, for
solving this problem (Section ??); and compare these different
algorithms via simulation experiments on randomly-generated
synthetic workloads (Section ??).
The model of computation that we are considering in this
paper is rather restrictive: several reasonable generalizations
(a few of which are discussed in Section ?? and others are
enumerated in Section ??) could be thought of. We plan to
explore these generalizations in future work – we look upon
the results in the current paper as an initial step towards
developing a body of results that will prove capable of dealing
with a far more general model of LEC-based computations
than the simple one we consider here.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
As discussed above, we consider multi-stage computations
in which a series of functional blocks are to be executed
in a specified sequence, and we have a choice of several
different implementations for each stage. Let n denote the
number of stages, and m the maximum number of available
alternative implementations for any stage. (An example multi-
stage computation with n and m both equal to 2 is depicted
in Figure ??.). Let V ∈ N denote a target value that must be
obtained cumulatively across all stages of the computation. We
will use the notation Ii,j to denote the j’th implementation
choice for the i’th stage, 0 ≤ i < n and 0 ≤ j < m. Let
Vi,j ∈ N denote the value that is obtained by executing the
implementation Ii,j , and let Ci,j ∈ N denote the duration of
this execution — we do not assume that the numerical value of
these parameters are known prior to executing Ii,j (and indeed
allow for the possibility that they may be different on different
executions of Ii,j). Consider some execution of the end-
to-end computation, and let φ(i) denote the implementation
of the i’th stage that is chosen (i.e., Ii,φ(i) is the executed
implementation) for each i, 0 ≤ i < n. (Note that the
function φ(·) thus specifies the schedule for the computation.)
It is required that this function φ(·) satisfy the constraint that
∑
i Vi,φ(i) ≥ V; from amongst all such φ, we seek the one
that minimizes
∑
i Ci,φ(i). That is, our correctness constraint
is that the sum of the values returned across all n stages should
equal (or exceed) the specified threshold value V , while the
performance objective is that the cumulative duration of the
computation be minimized.
As stated above, the Cij , Vij values are unknown prior to
actually executing Ii,j , and will in general take on different
values each time Ii,j is executed. In order to be able to do pre-
run-time verification, it is necessary that worst-case bounds be
known on the values that these quantities may take. Let ci,j
and vi,j denote safe worst-case bounds on the values of Ci,j
and Vi,j respectively, that can be determined beforehand; by
“safe,” we mean that it is guaranteed that Ci,j ≤ ci,j and
Vi,j ≥ vi,j for all executions of Ii,j .
• The value of ci,j is what is commonly referred to in the
real-time computing literature as the worst-case execution
time (WCET) of the implementation Ii,j , and may be
determined using the wide range of tools, techniques, and
methodologies for WCET-determination [?] that have been
developed within the real-time computing community.
• We require that similar tools, techniques, and methodologies
be developed that enable us to determine lower bounds on
the value of the computation that is performed by an LEC.
While we recognize that this is a major “ask” that will
require a large concerted effort on the part of the safety-
critical systems community, we believe it is unavoidable —
we don’t really see any other path to enabling the safe and
effective use of LECs in safety-critical systems.
If we are to be able to verify correctness of a given compu-
tation prior to run-time, it is evident that there should exist
some implementation of each stage such that the worst-case
value bounds of these implementations sum to at least the
target value – this correctness requirement is formalized in
Section ?? as a feasibility test, and computations passing
the feasibility test are said to be feasible. If a computation
is deemed feasible, our approach, as briefly described in
Section ??, will generate a schedule prior to run-time that can
be verified for correctness, and shown to have an acceptably
small duration. What properties must such a schedule satisfy?
Recall that the function φ : [0, . . . , n − 1] → [0, . . . ,m − 1]
specifies the schedule for the computation – i.e., which im-
plementation of each stage is selected for execution. One










i=0 vi,φ(i) ≥ V
)
. Such a schedule guarantees to
have the optimal (i.e., smallest) duration bound in the worst
case; in the absence of additional information about run-time
behavior, this is a reasonable initial schedule to choose to work
with. However, it may be the case that additional information
regarding run-time behavior is available prior to run-time (in
addition to the worst-case bounds ci,j and vi,j); if so, it may be
possible to use such additional information in order to further
optimize the initial schedule provided we are able to do so
without compromising the correctness guarantee whatsoever.
An example of such additional information that may be
available, that we believe may be particularly interesting and
useful, is suggested by Quinton et al. [?] via the concept of
typical analysis. The idea behind typical analysis is that while
a worst-case characterization of a system must encompass all
possible behaviors of the system, a “typical” characterization
excludes pathological behaviors that are extremely unlikely
to occur in practice.2 Let us suppose that our multi-stage
computation is subjected to such typical-case analysis, and let
2E.g., worst-case characterization of the value obtained by an implemen-
tation may be obtained by performing static analysis of the implementation,
making worst-case (or pessimistic) assumptions and rigorously proving the
value that will be obtained under these assumptions. In contrast, a typical
characterization of this value may be obtained via extensive experimentation
and measurement, executing the implementation under a wide range of




I0,0: (6, 6, 30, 30) I0,1: (4, 6, 10, 10)
I1,0:(7, 7, 50, 50) I1,1:(4, 4, 20, 20)
Fig. 1: An example instance: a 2-stage computation (n = 2),
with two possible implementations per stage (m = 2), that must
achieve a value of at least 10 (V = 10). The 4-tuples represent the
(vi,j , v
T
i,j , ci,j , c
T
i,j) parameters of the implementations.
parameters cTi,j and v
T
i,j denote the typical execution duration
of, and the typical value obtained by, the implementation Ii,j ;
the interpretation of these parameters being that implementa-
tion Ii,j will complete execution within a duration no greater
than cTi,j (Ci,j ≤ c
T
i,j) and obtain a value no smaller than
vTi,j (Vi,j ≥ v
T
i,j) in all non-pathological executions of the
computation.
Problem statement. We now summarize our workload model,
and the problem we seek to solve. A problem instance is
specified by specifying values for
• the number of stages n of the multi-stage computation;
• the maximum number of alternative implementations m for
each stage;
• the target value V that is needed for correctness; and
• the worst-case and typical values ci,j and c
T
i,j for the
execution-duration and vi,j and v
T
i,j for the value-obtained
parameters, for each implementation Ii,j , 0 ≤ i < n, 0 ≤
j < m.
Given an instance specified in this manner, we will consider
how to schedule it in order to guarantee correctness under all
circumstances (assuming this is possible – i.e., the instance is
feasible) while optimizing for duration. We will consider two
different objectives with regards to this optimization criterion
1) minimize duration under all circumstances; and
2) minimize duration under all non-pathological conditions
only (while continuing to guaranteeing correctness under
all circumstances, including atypical, pathological ones).
We illustrate some of these concepts (in particular, the differ-
ence between the two optimization criteria) via an example:
Example 1. Consider a 2-stage computation (n = 2) with a
choice of 2 implementations per stage (m = 2), for which
correctness requires that a cumulative value of at least 10
be obtained (V = 10) — see Figure ??. This example
has been constructed to be particularly simple in order to
highlight the difference between the two optimization criteria:
the typical delay estimate for each of the four implementations
is equal to its worst-case delay estimates, and the second
implementation of the first stage, I0,1, is the only one of the
four implementations for which its typical value estimate is
different from its worst-case estimate (the specification of this
implementation is enclosed within a box in the figure).
This instance is clearly feasible; e.g., executing the im-
plementations I0,0 and I1,0 yields a value ≥ v0,0 + v1,0 =
(6 + 7) = 13, which is ≥ the target value V of 10.
If we seek to optimize for the worst case, then the initial
schedule would choose the implementations I0,0 and I1,1
(equivalently, φ(0) ← 0 and φ(1) ← 1), for a cumulative
value at least v0,0 + v1,1 = (6 + 4) = 10 (thereby assuring
correctness), and a corresponding duration bound equal to
c0,0 + c1,1 = (30 + 20) or 50.
If, however, we seek to optimize for the typical case, then
the initial schedule would choose the implementations I0,1 and
I1,0 (equivalently, φ(0)← 1 and φ(1)← 0). This guarantees
a cumulative value at least v0,1+v1,0 = (4+7) = 11, thereby
assuring correctness.
• During a typical execution of I0,1, we would expect to
obtain a value ≥ vT0,1 or 6. This will be determined by the
run-time monitor, which will thus know that the remaining
value that needs to be obtained is at most (V − 6), or 4.
But this value can also be guaranteed by implementation
I1,1 (because v1,1 = 4); since I1,1 has a smaller execution
duration than I1,0, the run-time monitor will modify the
remainder of the schedule by changing φ(1) to equal 1.
Implementation I1,1 is therefore executed next, for a dura-
tion bound equal to (10 + 20) or 30. Hence under typical
circumstances the duration bound of 30 (rather than the 50
that was obtained by optimizing for worst-case behavior).
• Even during non-typical (pathological) executions, I0,1
guarantees a value of at least 4. If the value obtained is
determined to be smaller than 6 by the run-time monitor,
then implementation I1,0 is executed next as per the ini-
tial schedule (that was constructed prior to run-time); the
resulting duration bound is then equal to (10 + 50) or 60.
As illustrated in the example above, optimizing for typical-
case behavior may yield very different schedules than opti-
mizing for worst-case behavior. Which is more appropriate
to use? We argue that there is no single good answer here:
different applications and different use-cases may favor one
over the other. Optimizing for typical-case behavior results in
better average performance (assuming that the typical cases
are accurately characterized), which optimizing for worst-case
behavior ensures smaller durations under all circumstances.
We therefore consider below, a number of algorithms for
scheduling under both optimization metrics; we reiterate that
the algorithms for both metrics guarantee correctness under
all circumstances – even if duration is being optimized for the
typical case, correctness guarantees remain worst-case ones.
III. ALGORITHMS FOR ANALYSIS AND SCHEDULING
We now propose several different approaches for solving
the scheduling optimization problem that was formalized in
Section ?? above; all involve deciding at each stage which
of the available implementations to choose. These approaches
may be characterized along four orthogonal axes:
1) LOCAL/ GLOBAL: is the choice at a stage made based
only on information available at that stage, or are the static
attributes of future stages taken into account?
2) STATIC/ DYNAMIC: is the schedule that must be synthe-
sized prior to run-time and verified for safety, subject to
modification based on information obtained via run-time
monitoring?
3) OPTIMAL/ HEURISTIC: We will both consider approaches
for which precise notions of optimality can be proved, and
ones based on what appear to be intuitively reasonable
heuristics.
4) WORST-CASE/ TYPICAL: as discussed above, the problem
framework is open to a worst-case or typical-case focus.
Recall that our correctness requirement mandates that we ob-
tain a cumulative value ≥ V across all the stages of our multi-
stage computation. Hence a feasibility test would check that
the largest worst-case value obtainable at each stage, summed





{vi,j} ≥ V . As
the computation progresses, in order to retain feasibility it is
necessary that the actual cumulative value obtained thus far,
plus the largest values obtainable from the remaining stages,
remains ≥ V .
From this consideration of feasibility and the character-
istics outlined above it is possible to define a number of
potential scheduling approaches; Figure ?? enumerates a (non-
exhaustive) list of potential candidates. The first three are
based upon reasonable heuristics that are very efficiently
implementable; the last two are obtained by applying standard
dynamic programming techniques that translate into pseudo-
polynomial time algorithms,3 to obtain optimal solutions.
IV. ADDING STATE AND MODES
As stated in Section ??, the model of computation consid-
ered in this paper is rather restrictive; analysis of this simple
model should be considered a (necessary) first step towards
enabling the safe use of LECs in safety-critical systems.
We now describe two generalizations that we believe would
enhance its applicability; we have some preliminary ideas as
to how to extend our analysis techniques to deal with these
extensions, that we propose to study as future research.
State. Since we are modeling multi-stage computations, it
is likely that some state is generated by a stage and com-
municated to subsequent stages, in the sense that (some
of) this state will influence the behavior of the available
implementations of subsequent stages. For instance, the typical
value that is obtained by an implementation may depend
upon the progress achieved by the implementations chosen.
at previous stages. Consider for example a stage of an image
3Due to lack of space we will not describe these algorithms here, instead
explaining what each seeks to optimize. They are compared with the simple
heuristics in our experimental evaluation (Section ??). We will detail these
algorithms in an extended version of this paper currently under preparation.
1) NAÏVE: At each stage, execute the implementation with the largest
worst-case value (vi,j). This strategy ensures a correct solution
for any feasible instance, and will hence constitute the baseline
strategy for our experimental evaluation.
2) LARGEST (vT/cT): At each stage execute the implementation
with the largest typical “value density” from amongst those
implementations that retain feasibility.
3) SMALLEST cT: At each stage execute the implementation with
the smallest typical execution duration from amongst those im-
plementations that retain feasibility.
4) WORST-CASE: The initially-generated schedule seeks to optimize
for worst-case behavior; modifications made to this schedule in
response to run-time monitoring make use of worst-case parameter
estimates for future stages.
5) TYPICAL: The initially-generated schedule, as well as modifica-
tions resulting from run-time monitoring, seek to optimize for
typical-case behavior; the notion of typical-case optimality is
analogous to that described in [?], [?].
Fig. 2: The scheduling strategies considered.
progressing algorithm tasked with determining how many
people there are in an image. The next stage may consist
of classifiers, some of which are sensitive to this number.
Knowing the value achieved at the previous stage is one
method of capturing influence, but in general it is likely that
further state information will be required.
The introduction of value-influencing state does not effect
the framework developed in this paper. We retain the notions
of worst-case value and duration, and hence retain the same
definition of feasibility. However, the optimization problem
becomes more difficult if there is a significant quantity of state
with this influencing role; there may be more typical values
to accommodate.
Modes. Some implementations may have more than one mode
of operation: they offer a number of “(value, computation-
time)” profiles, that are mutually incomparable. If the number
of such modes is small then this is essentially equivalent to
having more actual implementations (that happen to share the
same worst-case behavior). However if the number of modes
is high, or any one of a continuum of profiles is possible
(as is the case with some anytime algorithms), then it is not
immediately evident whether our proposed algorithms would
scale appropriately with the number of modes that need to be
considered.
As future work we will attempt to classify the problem
space into domains that are amenable to optimal solutions and
those that will need to fall back on the use of heuristics. (Note
that in the evaluation section that follows the systems under
evaluation simple ones without state or modes.)
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We conducted our experimental evaluation upon two
synthetically-generated sets of 100 multistage computation
instances each – the two generation methods that we used are
detailed below. Each instance was separately scheduled over
500 simulated runs according to each of the five scheduling
approaches described in Figure ??. For each instance and each
strategy, we measured the cumulative computation duration
over all 500 simulations. We quantified the normalized per-




total duration of NAÏVE
total duration of S
We now briefly4 describe our two workload-generation
methods. All generated instances have ten stages (n = 10) and
a choice of five implementations per stage (m = 5). For every
one of the fifty implementations Ii,j in each generated in-
stance, we randomly select a sub-interval (vLij , v
H
ij) of (1, 100),
and a sub-interval (cLij , c
H
ij) of (1, 1000) – the manner in which
we do so for each of our two generation methods is discussed
below. The interpretation is that the duration of each execution
of Iij will be ≥ c
L
ij and ≤ c
H
ij , and the value obtained,
≥ vLij and ≤ v
H
ij ; in simulation runs during our experiments
we choose values from these intervals according to some
probability distribution (as discussed below). We assign the
worst-case parameters accordingly: vij ← v
L
ij , and cij ← c
H
ij .
For our experiments, we assign the typical parameters vTij and
cTij the expected value of the parameters (as discussed below).
Once all the parameters of all implementations of an
instance have been assigned values, we need to assign a
value to V , the target value parameter. Here we introduce
a configuration parameter p ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 90} denoting the










Generation Method 1. For each implementation Iij , c
L
ij and





uniformly over (1, 100). The actual durations taken and values
obtained by executing Iij during simulation runs are drawn
from one of two distributions (in different experiments): one
a symmetric distribution derived from the Normal distribution
and the other, a skewed distribution derived from the Gamma
distribution with shape parameter 2. Since we have a choice
of two forms of distributions for the computation duration and
for the value obtained, we have a total of 2 × 2 or four sub-
configurations; we report on results for all four.
Generation Method 2. Instances are generated to have a
positive correlation between the cTij and v
T
ij values for each im-
plementation. To do so, a value is assigned to vTij according to
the uniform distribution, and cTij set equal to v
T
ij (appropriately
scaled) plus some random noise. Next, values are assigned
to vLij and v
H







ensuring that vTij corresponds to the mean of our symmetric
distribution (derived from the normal distribution). Values for
cLij and c
H
ij are assigned analogously. The actual durations
taken and values obtained by executing Iij during simulation
4The 6-page limit prevents us from providing further detail here; we will
make fully annotated versions of our workload-generation code available on-
line subsequent to anonymous peer-review.
runs are drawn from the symmetric distribution only; we do
not use the skewed distribution in Generation Method 2.
Results. A subset of our results are graphically depicted in
Figures ?? and ??. As previously stated, performance of each
strategy is normalized against the performance of the baseline
NAÏVE strategy; the scale of the vertical axes in these graphs
represent this performance improvement. Each colored vertical
box extends from the lower to the upper quartile of the data
being depicted, with a horizontal black line at the median. The
“whiskers” show the range of the data (with extreme outliers
discarded – in plotting these graphs, the whis parameter5
retained its default value of 1.5).
In each of the graphs in Figure ??, each group represents
one of the four sub-configurations of Generation Method 1 that
are obtained by choosing symmetric or skewed distributions
for each of the two parameters, duration and value; individual
columns within these groups represent the four individual
strategies numbered (2)-(5) in Figure ??.
There is only one configuration for Generation Method
2, with both value and duration drawn from the symmetric
distribution. Figure ?? depicts the performance improvement
over NAÏVE for the different strategies, with each group
representing a different choice for parameter p (and hence V).
Discussion. In addition to providing strong evidence that
all the strategies considered appear to provide significant
improvement (up to a factor of 10) over the baseline NAÏVE
strategy, some obvious conclusions leap out from our experi-
mental observations. First, we note that in all our experiments
the simple local heuristic of choosing at each stage the imple-
mentation with smallest WCET that retains feasibility proves
remarkably efficient: its performance closely tracks that of the
optimal strategy TYPICAL, which requires pseudo-polynomial
pre-processing and run-time monitoring. Next, we observe
that skewing the distributions from which actual execution
durations and obtained values are drawn results in all the
algorithms showing improved performance vis-à-vis NAÏVE.
This is consistent with expectations: the more skewed the
distributions, the more benefit we would expect to obtain by
adapting our choice of implementations based upon run-time
monitoring observations. Third, we note that the performance
improvements obtained when Generation Method II is used are
significantly better than when Generation Method I is used
– the y-axis in Figure ?? is labeled over the range [0, 12]
in contrast to the range [0, 5] of Figure ??. This, too, is
intuitively appealing: correlated values of WCET and value
obtained imply that choosing an implementation that returns
greater value takes a greater duration, and hence making the
right choice should yield greater benefit. LARGEST (vT/cT)
is the only under-performer because it is uniquely ill-suited
for multi-stage computations generated under the correlation
hypothesis, since vT/cT is close to constant.
5See https://matplotlib.org/3.1.1/api/ as gen/matplotlib.pyplot.boxplot.html
figures/gen1/dynp20.pdf figures/gen1/dynp80.pdf
Fig. 3: Generation Method I: Comparing strategies at p = 20 (left figure) and p = 80 (right figure).
figures/gen2/dyn.pdf
Fig. 4: Generation Method II: Comparing strategies at p ∈
{60, 70, 80, 90}.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It appears inevitable that Learning-Enabled Components
(LECs) based upon deep learning and similar AI-based prin-
ciples will play an increasingly major role in safety-critical
autonomous CPS’s; it is therefore incumbent on the safety-
critical systems research community to devise techniques for
the analysis of such systems. This paper reports on our
initial efforts in this direction. We have proposed a formal
model for representing the behavior as well as the timing
properties of some kinds of LECs. We have formulated the
problem of synthesizing computations that can be modeled
as chains of functional blocks using LECs and that need to
achieve a minimum cumulative value to assure safety, and for
which performance is quantified by the total duration of the
computation, as an optimization problem. We have proposed
several strategies, some heuristic and others provably optimal,
for solving this optimization problem, and have compared
these different strategies via simulation experiments upon
synthetically generated workloads. As ongoing and future
work we are evaluating, and will continue to evaluate, specific
LECs (such as ones based on deep learning) to determine
whether they are amenable to representation using our model
and if not, how our model may be generalized to accommodate
them (see, e.g., the discussion in Section ?? that has come
out of our efforts in this direction). We will further develop
our workload generator and simulation platform, incorporating
insights from our study of specific LECs, in order to be able
to conduct more extensive experiments of the kind reported
in this paper. We plan to further explore the simple heuristic
“SMALLEST cT” that seems to have performed very well in
our experimental evaluation, to further study its properties and
thereby understand the conditions and circumstances where its
use is particularly warranted. From an algorithmic perspective,
we plan to formally characterize notions of optimality for com-
putations involving the use of LECs, and to develop algorithms
for generating optimal schedules for these computations.
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